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By Cynthia Ford
Wendy, the witness, testifi es in court, recounting the 
assault.  She claims that she was raped against her will; Dan, the 
defendant, insists that the intercourse was consensual.  (Th is 
might sound a little familiar?)  As the prosecutor, wouldn’t you 
want to augment Wendy’s in-court statement with all the other 
statements she made before trial, in which she said exactly the 
same thing to other people? If she said the same thing before to 
diff erent people on diff erent occasions, don’t we think it’s more 
likely that she is now telling the truth? And if you are the defense 
lawyer, shouldn’t the jury know that Wendy described the event 
diff erently to someone else before trial from what she has just 
told the jury?   In real life, isn’t one important way to tell whether 
the person is telling the truth to fi nd out if she said the same 
thing before?
Under the Montana Rules of Evidence, these two things—
prior consistent statements and prior inconsistent statements—
are treated very diff erently from each other, and in some 
respects, very diff erently from the Federal Rules of Evidence.  
Th e purpose of this article is to explore the Montana approach to 
prior inconsistent statements.  Part II, to be published next issue, 
will deal with the treatment of prior consistent statements.  (A 
discriminating reader has suggested that my previous Evidence 
Corner columns may be too long.  I agree, and apologize.  
Henceforth, I will try to curb my enthusiasm and reserve some of 
the “how-to” material for the forthcoming “Montana Evidence 
Handbook.”)
Introduction:  Prior Statements 
and the Hearsay Rule
M.R.E. 802 is the hearsay rule: “Hearsay is not admissible 
except as otherwise provided by statute, these rules, or other 
rules applicable in the courts of this state.”  M.R.E. 801 provides 
the defi nition of “hearsay,” and thus governs what is prohibited 
and what is not under Rule 802.  Th e general defi nition is in 
801(c): “Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, off ered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”  
All prior statements, consistent and inconsistent, satisfy 
the fi rst part of the hearsay defi nition:  they are all necessarily 
out-of-court statements.  Th e fact that the person who made 
the statements is now a witness in court does not change those 
earlier statements into in-court, non-hearsay statements.  Th e 
rule against hearsay provides three things:  the evidentiary 
statement is made under oath, the jury has the chance to 
observe the witness while she makes the statement to them, 
and cross-examination.  Th e fact that the same person who 
spoke out of court earlier is now a witness in court does provide 
cross-examination, but cannot supply either oath or observation 
of the earlier statement at the time it was made.  
A.  If the out-of-court statement is off ered to prove 
something other than the fact it asserts, such as for 
impeachment purposes, it is not hearsay, but then its use is 
limited to impeachment.
Th e second half of M.R.E. 801(c) confi nes hearsay treatment 
to those out-of-court statements which are not being off ered 
in court to prove the fact that they assert.  If the previous out-
of-court statement is being off ered for any other reason, it is 
not hearsay and is not barred by 802.  Th e Montana Evidence 
Commission Comment to M.R.E. 801 observes:
from the phrase “ ... off ered in evidence to prove 
the truth of the matter asserted,” statements off ered 
for purposes other than to prove the truth of their 
contents are not hearsay. …
It is theoretically correct to say that statements 
not off ered to prove the truth of their contents are 
not hearsay because their reliability is not in is-
sue, only whether or not the statement was made. 
Hearsay statements are ordinarily not admitted 
because their reliability cannot be tested by oath, 
cross-examination, and the presence of the trier of 
fact, the three ideal conditions under which testi-
mony is given by witnesses. Advisory Committee’s 
Note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 288 (1972). When a statement 
is introduced for purposes other than proving the 
truth of its content, the witness testifying as to the 
making of the statement by the hearsay declar-
ant is doing so under the three ideal conditions. 
Th erefore, statements which are off ered for pur-
poses other than to prove the truth of their content 
are not hearsay under the defi nition.
Th us, a lawyer can always meet “Objection! Hearsay!” by 
responding “Th is is an out of court statement, Your Honor, but I 
am not using it to prove the truth of its content.”  
Th e technical judge should then ask: “Well, what are you 
using it for, if not the truth of the content?”  You must satisfy 
the judge that you have some relevant reason for introducing 
the statement, other than to prove that what was said outside 
of court is true.  One of the primary “purposes other than to 
prove the truth of their content” is to show the credibility or 
incredibility of the witness on the stand.  You are not using the 
statement to prove the fact it asserts, but instead to show that the 
statement just made in court by the witness is false or true.  Th is 
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out-of-court statement (OCS) will support your closing that 
“witness X speaketh with forked tongue, so you can’t believe 
what she said here in court.”  Th erefore, you can skate by the 
hearsay objection and get the OCS in merely by saying “Your 
honor, I am introducing this OCS for impeachment purposes 
only.” (M.R.E. 4011 explicitly states that “Relevant evidence may 
include evidence bearing upon the credibility of a witness or 
hearsay declarant.”)  
If the only permissible use of the OCS is impeachment or 
rehabilitation of an in-court witness, the fact-fi nder may not use 
the contents of the OCS in deciding the facts of the case.  Th e 
only permissible use of the OCS is for the jury to consider it in 
deciding if the witness was truthful on the stand.  If no other 
evidence of the fact asserted in the OCS is introduced, that fact 
is not proven.  Under M.R.E. 105, the party opposing the OCS 
is entitled, upon request, to a limiting instruction on this point.  
(Lawyers, judges and commentators are divided on the effi  cacy 
of such an instruction.)  If you are able to get an OCS in for a 
limited purpose, you must also introduce at least a scintilla (I 
call this a chinchilla) of other evidence on which a jury could 
fi nd in your favor, or the favorable verdict may be reversed.
For example, imagine a debt collection case brought by an 
estate. Th e defendant’s brother testifi es as a witness at trial that 
their family has a strict policy of “neither a borrower or a lender 
be,”  so the defendant never would have  borrowed any money 
from the decedent.  On rebuttal, the plaintiff  calls the brother’s 
barber, who testifi es that the brother told the barber that the 
brothers had borrowed money from Joe but would never have to 
pay it back because Joe was now dead.  If this OCS is allowed in 
for impeachment only, the jury cannot use it to fi nd that a loan 
occurred.  At most, it can fi nd that the brother lied on the stand, 
but this is cannot satisfy the plaintiff ’s burden of proof.
B.  M.R.E. 801(d)  magically transposes some out-of-court 
statements off ered to prove their contents into non-hearsay, 
which are not aff ected by Rule 802, and can be admitted as 
substantive evidence.
Rule 801(d)(1) provides, outright, that three kinds of prior 
OCS by a person who testifi es at trial are simply not hearsay, 
even if they are off ered for the truth of the facts they assert.   
Th ese types of statements are not exceptions to the hearsay rule; 
they are not hearsay at all. Th erefore, they are not subject to Rule 
802 and are admissible to prove the facts they assert.  Th e exact 
text of the rule is:
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A state-
ment is not hearsay if: 
1) Prior statement by witness. Th e declarant 
testifi es at the trial or hearing and is subject to 
cross-examination concerning the statement, and 
the statement is 
(A) inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony, 
or
1  This phrase does not occur in the federal version of Rule 401, either as originally 
written or as amended in 2011, although there are many federal cases indicating 
that the credibility of a witness is relevant, at least on non-collateral matters.  
 (B) consistent with the declarant’s testimony 
and is off ered to rebut an express or implied 
charge against the declarant of subsequent fabrica-
tion, improper infl uence or motive, or 
(C) one of identifi cation of a person made aft er 
perceiving the person;
Th e Montana Evidence Commission Comment indicates that 
the Commission modeled 801(d) on the F.R.E. but modifi ed two 
of the three federal subdivisions (which I will discuss in more 
detail below) for use in Montana:
Th e eff ect of this rule is to place certain state-
ments “ ... which would otherwise literally fall 
within ... ” the hearsay defi nition outside the hear-
say rule.
Subdivision (d)(1) deals with certain prior 
statements of the witness who is now testifying 
and subject to ideal conditions of oath, cross-
examination, and presence of the trier of fact. Th e 
Commission feels that the application of the con-
ditions at the trial or hearing is suffi  cient to take 
these statements out of the hearsay rule, for requir-
ing their application at the time the statement was 
made would have the eff ect of excluding almost 
all prior statements. Th erefore, these prior state-
ments are admitted as substantive evidence. It 
should also be noted that the subdivision limits the 
types of prior statements placed outside the hear-
say rule to three: Th is is a compromise between 
allowing “general use of prior prepared statements 
as substantive evidence” which could lead to an 
abuse of preferring prepared statements to actual 
testimony, and allowing no prior statements to be 
admitted, which is not sensible, for “ ... particu-
lar circumstances call for a contrary result. Th e 
judgment is one more for experience than logic”. 
Advisory Committee’s Note, supra 56 F.R.D. at 295. 
(Emphasis added).
1.  Under M.R.E. 801(d)(1)(A), all prior inconsistent 
statements are now admissible as substantive evidence to prove 
the facts they assert.
If the witness testifi es at trial, anything else she said on the 
same subject before trial which contradicts her testimony is 
admissible not just for impeachment of her in-court testimony, 
but to prove the fact that she stated earlier, out of court.  Th e 
Commission noted that the existing Montana law on the use 
of prior inconsistent statements was quite confusing (see 
below) and that “the apparent practice in Montana is to give a 
cautionary instruction that prior inconsistent statements may be 
used only for impeachment purposes. Th erefore, this clause has 
the eff ect of clarifying as well as changing existing Montana 
law.” Th e Commission cited two other rationales for this new 
treatment of prior inconsistent statements:  that juries might 
not follow the standard cautionary instruction, and that “this 
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statement is always made closer in time to the event, free from 
any infl uences, and therefore has an assurance of trustworthiness 
like many hearsay exceptions.”  
In an attorney disbarment proceeding decided just aft er 
the adoption of the Montana Rules of Evidence, the defending 
attorney objected to admission of prior inconsistent statements 
to prove the facts they asserted.  Th e Montana Supreme Court 
agreed that at least prior to a 1941 case, State v. Jolly, 112 Mont. 
352, 116 P.2d 686, “previous inconsistent statements of a witness 
were admissible for impeachment purposes only and did not 
constitute substantive evidence,” and that in the period of 
time aft er Jolly but before the M.R.E. were adopted, the law of 
Montana on the admission of prior inconsistent statements for 
substantive rather than impeachment purposes was “in fl ux.”  
Matter of Goldman, 179 Mont. 526, 549, 588 P.2d 964, 977 
(1978).  Th e Court went on to observe that:
With this background, the Commission on 
Rules of Evidence in proposing the new Rules of 
Evidence for this Court felt prior inconsistent state-
ments were admissible as substantive evidence, and 
suggested for adoption, Rule 801(d)(1) (A), accord-
ingly. Th is Court had approved those rules prior to 
the hearing hereunder, even though the eff ective 
date would not begin until July 1, 1977.
Th e foregoing cases would indicate the law in 
Montana on this point was in fl ux, but the Court 
was moving toward a change in the rule of Wise 
v. Stagg, supra. Th e matter is now settled with the 
adoption of the Montana Rules of Evidence. Such 
testimony is now clearly admissible for substan-
tive purposes.  (Emphasis added)
Matter of Goldman, 179 Mont. at 550, 588 P.2d at 977 (1978). 
Th e Montana prior inconsistent statement rule is much 
more inclusive than the federal version of 801(d)(1)(A).  Th e 
federal rules allow use of only those prior statements which are 
inconsistent with the declarant/witness’s trial testimony AND 
which were made “given under penalty of perjury at a trial, 
hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition.”  In Montana, 
any prior inconsistent statement, made anywhere, anytime, 
is usable.  Th is means that a Montanan who spills her guts at 
the Stockmen’s (Stockpersons’?) Bar and later tells a Montana 
state jury something quite diff erent can expect to see the 
bartender take (I originally wrote “mount” but the visual was 
bad) the stand.  If the same case were tried in the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Montana, her drunken rambling 
would be inadmissible except for its impeachment value.  Th e 
Montana Commission explained its decision to broaden the 
prior inconsistent statement rule: “Th e clause deletes the oath 
requirement as unnecessary and harmful to the usefulness of the 
rule. Th e Commission believes that prior inconsistent statements 
should be admissible as substantive evidence.”
Th e only requirement to admit a prior inconsistent statement 
is that the declarant must have testifi ed at trial, and the prior 
statement is inconsistent with that testimony.  If the witness 
testifi es that the light was green, and somewhere else told 
someone that the light was red, there is a clear inconsistency 
and the earlier statement is admissible.  Further, the Montana 
Supreme Court has held that even a minor inconsistency suffi  ces 
under Rule 801(d)(1)(A).  In State v. Herman, the defendant was 
accused of stabbing a man with whom the defendant and his 
father had had a bar fi ght.  Th e night of the stabbing, the police 
interviewed the defendant’s father on video (which the police 
lost, held to be harmless) and the father also wrote out a half 
page statement. “¶ 37 In his testimony at trial, Herman’s father 
said he chatted with the bartender for a minute or two before 
going outside. In his written statement, he said he followed 
Herman outside. Th us, there is inconsistency between his 
testimony and his statement, even though it is minor. Th e 
District Court’s admission of the statement into evidence was in 
accordance with M.R. Evid. 801(d)(1), which provides a prior 
oral or written statement inconsistent with the testimony of a 
trial witness is admissible.”  State v. Herman, 350 Mont. 109, 117, 
204 P.3d 1254, 1260 (2009).  (Again, this case earlier describes 
the use of the prior inconsistent statement as for “impeachment” 
but this restriction is unnecessary because the rule defi nes the 
prior inconsistent statement as non-hearsay, thus usable for 
substantive purposes).  
Rule 801(d)(1)(A) also applies where the witness said 
something on the subject outside of court and now testifi es that 
she does not remember anything about that subject, and/or that 
she does not remember giving an earlier statement.
Montana law used to be a mess, to say the least, on the 
issue of whether memory lapse is a form of “inconsistency” so 
as to invoke 801(d)(1)(A).  When the Commission forwarded 
its version of the M.R.E. to the Supreme Court, its Comment 
to 801(d)(1)(A) included this language: “It is the intent of the 
Commission that a witness’ failure to recollect at a trial or 
hearing is an inconsistency under 801(d)(1)(A) when a witness 
has made a prior statement on the matter under inquiry.”  
Despite this clear language in the Comment, aft er the M.R.E. 
were adopted, two diff erent lines of decisions developed, one 
holding that a failure of memory is an inconsistent statement, 
and the other the opposite. Th e Court acknowledged and 
resolved this discrepancy in State v. Lawrence, 285 Mont. 140, 
159, 948 P. 2nd 186, 198 (1997):  
“Given the weight of authority, we believe 
Devlin is the better reasoned opinion, and hold 
that a claimed lapse of memory is an inconsistency 
within the meaning of Rule 801(d)(1)(A). To 
the extent that our prior decision in Goodwin is 
inconsistent with this holding, it is overruled.” 
(Emphasis supplied).  
In the Lawrence case, the witness Mary was diagnosed with 
dementia, possibly Alzheimer’s.  Prior to trial, she had given 5 
statements to the police.  At trial, she frequently said she couldn’t 
remember certain facts, and also that she couldn’t remember 
having given prior statements about them.  Th e Court held that 
this testimony was inconsistent with her prior statements, and 
affi  rmed the judge’s admission of them under M.R.E. 801(d)(1)
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(A).  (Th is case is also very useful for reviewing HOW to admit 
prior inconsistent statements).
In State v. Howard, 362 Mont. 196, 204, 265 P.3d 606, 613 
(2011), the Court reaffi  rmed its holding in Lawrence:  “In that 
case, we also stated a claimed lapse of memory constitutes an 
inconsistent statement for the purposes of M.R. Evid. 801(d)(1)
(A). Lawrence, 285 Mont. at 159, 948 P.2d at 198. We did not, 
however, hold claimed memory lapse was the only ground for 
application of Rule 80 1(d)(1)(A).”  In Howard, the child victim/
witness on the stand in a sexual abuse case recanted several pre-
vious statements and said she didn’t remember others; the court 
allowed a DVD of the child’s pretrial interviews into evidence.  
Both trial court decisions were affi  rmed on appeal.  
Th us, prior inconsistent statements are clearly admissible 
in Montana state court trials.  Once the witness has testifi ed 
on the stand, anything else she has said on the same subject, 
anywhere, any time, to anyone, which outright contradicts her 
trial testimony, or serves to fi ll a memory lapse on the stand, is 
admissible, not just for impeachment but also to prove the fact 
she earlier asserted.
Coming next month: Part II, Prior Consistent Statements in 
Montana
Cynthia Ford is a professor at the University of Montana School of Law 
where she teaches Civil Procedure, Evidence, Family Law, and Remedies.
-----------------
Editor’s note and correction: Th e February edition of this 
series, “A refresher: Montana evidence law sources and research,” 
containted an incorrect reference referring to the “parol evidence 
rule” on page 41. Th e correct reference is as follows:
28-2-905. When extrinsic evidence concerning a written 
agreement may be considered. (1) Whenever the terms of an 
agreement have been reduced to writing by the parties, it is to 
be considered as containing all those terms. Th erefore, there can 
be between the parties and their representatives or successors in 
interest no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the 
contents of the writing except in the following cases:
     (a) when a mistake or imperfection of the writing is put in 
issue by the pleadings;
     (b) when the validity of the agreement is the fact in 
dispute.
     (2) Th is section does not exclude other evidence of the 
circumstances under which the agreement was made or to which 
it relates, as described in 1-4-102, or other evidence to explain an 
extrinsic ambiguity or to establish illegality or fraud.
     (3) Th e term “agreement”, for the purposes of this section, 
includes deeds and wills as well as contracts between parties.
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